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Abstract
In online display advertising, guaranteed contracts and
real-time bidding (RTB) are two major ways to sell im-
pressions for a publisher. Despite the increasing popular-
ity of RTB, there is still half of online display advertising
revenue generated from guaranteed contracts. Therefore,
simultaneously selling impressions through both guar-
anteed contracts and RTB is a straightforward choice
for a publisher to maximize its yield. However, deriv-
ing the optimal strategy to allocate impressions is not a
trivial task, especially when the environment is unstable
in real-world applications. In this paper, we formulate
the impression allocation problem as an auction problem
where each contract can submit virtual bids for individ-
ual impressions. With this formulation, we derive the
optimal impression allocation strategy by solving the
optimal bidding functions for contracts. Since the bids
from contracts are decided by the publisher, we pro-
pose a multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) ap-
proach to derive cooperative policies for the publisher to
maximize its yield in an unstable environment. The pro-
posed approach also resolves the common challenges in
MARL such as input dimension explosion, reward credit
assignment, and non-stationary environment. Experimen-
tal evaluations on large-scale real datasets demonstrate
the effectiveness of our approach.
Introduction
In recent years, online display advertising has become one
of the most influential businesses with $39.4 billion revenue1
for FY 2017 in US alone (iab, 2017). As shown in Fig. 1,
typically when a user visits a publisher, e.g., a news website,
there would be one or more ad impression opportunities
generated in real time. Advertisers are able to acquire these
opportunities to display their ads at certain costs and these
costs eventually become the revenue of the publisher.
For a publisher, there are two major ways to sell impres-
sions in the field of display advertising. The first one is
through guaranteed contracts (also referred as guaranteed
delivery (Chen, Yuan, and Wang, 2014)). A guaranteed con-
tract is an agreement between an advertiser and a publisher
by negotiating directly or by going through a programmatic
guaranteed mechanism (Chen et al.). The contract usually
Copyright c© 2019, All rights reserved.
1Display-related ad formats include: Banner and Video.
Figure 1: An example of online display ads. Advertisers can
show their ads on publishers’ websites and/or apps to the
targeted audience with certain cost (revenue to the publisher).
specifies the contract payment amount, the campaign dura-
tion and the desired number of ad impressions. The advertiser
typically makes the payment before the ad delivery starts and
the publisher guarantees the desired number of ad impres-
sions. The publisher is also responsible for any shortfall in
the number of impressions delivered. A penalty is usually
incurred based on the volume of under-delivery.
The second way to sell impressions is through real-time
bidding (RTB). RTB allows advertisers to bid in real-time for
impressions and does not guarantee the impression volume
for any advertiser (Yuan, Wang, and Zhao, 2013). For each
impression opportunity, the advertiser offering the highest
bid wins the opportunity to display its ad. The cost of the
winner is determined based on the auction mechanism. In
this paper, without loss of generality, we focus our discus-
sion under the second price auction (Edelman, Ostrovsky,
and Schwarz, 2007) where the winning advertiser is charged
the second highest bid in the auction. Our approach is also
applicable under other auction mechanisms such as Vick-
rey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) (Nisan et al., 2007).
Despite the increasing popularity of RTB, there is still half
of the online display advertising revenue generated from guar-
anteed contracts according to (eMarketer). For a publisher,
simultaneously selling impressions through both guaranteed
contracts and RTB is a straightforward choice in terms of
maximizing its yield. The challenge turns out to be how the
impressions should be allocated when guaranteed contracts
and RTB are both acquiring impressions. In other words, we
are interested in deriving the optimal impression allocation
strategy for the publisher. Generally speaking, there are three
main considerations when a publisher strategically allocates
its impressions in this scenario.
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• Maximizing total revenue: The revenue is associated
with guaranteed contracts, the revenue from RTB, and
the potential contract violation penalties.
• Fulfilling guaranteed contracts: Under-delivery is prob-
lematic since it may be harmful for the credit of the pub-
lisher. It is common to negotiate proper violation penalties
to resolve this challenge.
• Ensuring impression quality for guaranteed contracts:
Advertisers with guaranteed contracts are more and more
concerned with the impression quality. Quality of the de-
livered impressions is crucial to ensure the long-term value
of these advertisers.
The above considerations are common in real-world sce-
narios. Therefore, deriving the optimal impression allocation
strategy is not a trivial task. What makes it even more chal-
lenging is the instability of the environment. When deriv-
ing the optimal impression allocation strategy, the stationary
assumptions presented in the work by (Li et al., 2016; Jau-
vion and Grislain, 2018; Balseiro et al., 2014) are difficult
to satisfy in the real-world scenarios. First, the environment
stability is vulnerable to unexpected traffic changes such as
those brought by sales events on holidays. Second, usually
concurrent with the traffic changes, the market price distribu-
tion of the impressions can also deviate from the empirical.
Finally, the unpredictable advertiser behaviors in RTB includ-
ing modifying budget, bid, and targeted audience can make
the environment more complicated and dynamic (Wu et al.,
2018).
To derive an optimal impression allocation strategy that
takes into account the above-mentioned considerations and
challenges, we propose to analyze the problem from a novel
perspective. Since the allocation is non-trivial and the envi-
ronment is highly dynamic, can the guaranteed contracts also
participate in the real-time auctions so that they can also en-
joy the liquidity and the impressions can be fully auctioned?
More specifically, can each guaranteed contract be treated as
a bidding agent which is able to submit bids for individual
impressions and the impression allocation is based on the
submitted bids from both guaranteed contracts and RTB? We
will show that such a setup can actually lead us to the optimal
impression allocation strategy. And the optimal strategy also
possesses the appealing property that the optimal bid from a
guaranteed contract only depends on the impression quality
and the under-delivery penalty, regardless of the RTB status.
It is worth noting that the bidding agents representing the
guaranteed contracts are essentially different from those rep-
resenting RTB ads. Their submitted bids are actually decided
by the publisher. In other words, they are able to cooperate
with each other to achieve the optimum and this is one of the
key ideas in this paper. Since they submit bids in real-time to
participate in auctions in an unstable environment, it is natural
to employ the multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL)
approach to learn the optimal strategy. We follow the work
in (Lowe et al., 2017) and propose the multi-agent policy
optimization with local observations (MAPOLO) approach
to boost the convergence by shaping the reward function (Wu
et al., 2018). With MAPOLO, the common challenges in
MARL are effectively addressed, such as input dimension ex-
plosion2, reward credit assignment (Foerster et al., 2017), and
non-stationary environment caused by agent policy changes
(Tesauro, 2004).
To evaluate the effectiveness of our approach, we con-
ducted experiments on large-scale real-world datasets. Com-
pared with some of the state-of-the-art methods, we observed
substantial improvements on both impression allocation re-
sults and MARL performance metrics. Our main contribu-
tions can be summarized as follows:
1. We study the problem of optimal impression allocation
in display advertising with both guaranteed contracts and
RTB. A novel and efficient allocation strategy is proposed
and we prove that it is essentially optimal.
2. We devise a MARL approach to achieve the optimum in
the non-stationary and highly dynamic environment. To
the best of our knowledge, this is the first work of applying
MARL in impression allocation.
3. Our MARL approach also addresses some common chal-
lenges in MARL including input dimension explosion,
reward credit assignment and non-stationary environment
caused by the change of agent policy.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The opti-
mal impression allocation strategy is derived in section 2.
In section 3, we present our MARL approach to learn the
optimal strategy and demonstrate its merits in dealing with
some common MARL challenges. Experimental evaluation
results are shown in section 4, followed by the related work
in section 5. We conclude the paper in section 6.
Optimal Impression Allocation
For the publishers who sell impressions through both guar-
anteed contracts and RTB, one of their impression allocation
motivations is to maximize the total revenue from both con-
tracts and RTB. Meanwhile, the impression quality3 of the
contracts can affect the satisfaction of the contract advertisers
and therefore affect the long-term revenue. The ultimate goal
of impression allocation is to simultaneously maximize RTB
revenue, contract revenue, and contract impression quality.
Problem Formulation
Suppose there are n impressions indexed by i to be allocated
by the publisher. On the one hand, suppose that there are
m guaranteed contracts indexed by j to be served. For each
contract j, let dj be the demand impression volume and cj
be the unit price of each impression so that the contract value
is cjdj . Suppose the contract violation penalty of contract j
for each impression is pj , that is, if the impressions served
to contract j is less than dj , the publisher will have to be
responsible for the penalty at pj each impression. On the
other hand, for each impression i, RTB will also provide a
list of bids of which we are mostly interested in the first and
second highest bids bi1 and bi2 under the second-price auc-
tion mechanism. If the impression is allocated to RTB, then
2The critic will receive the observations and actions from all
agents as input in (Lowe et al., 2017).
3We abuse the concept impression quality a little bit here so that
it reflects both contract fulfillment and average impression quality.
RTB
Guaranteed 
contracts
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Figure 2: Impression allocation process of a publisher. Pub-
lishers aim to maximize the sum of RRTB , RGC and QGC .
the publisher will earn bi2. Let xij be the binary indicator
whether impression i is allocated to contract j and obviously
if
∑
j xij = 0 then the impression is allocated to RTB, we
are able to derive revenues from both guaranteed contracts
and RTB. More specifically, the revenue from guaranteed con-
tracts is RGC = Σjcjdj −Σjpjyj where yj = dj −Σixij is
the impression under-delivery amount and the revenue from
RTB isRRTB = Σi(1−Σjxij)bi2. Since we also care about
the impression quality delivered to guaranteed contracts, let
qij be impression i’s quality for contract j and λj be the
quality weight, the total contract impression quality can be
denoted by QGC = Σijλjxijqij . As mentioned above, our
goal of impression allocation is to maximize both revenue
RGC +RRTB and qualityQGC for short-term and long-term
benefits. By putting these objectives together, we define yield
as RGC +RRTB +QGC . The optimal impression allocation
problem can be formulated as follows4:
maximize
xij ,yj
RGC +RRTB +QGC (LP1)
s.t. Σixij + yj ≥ dj , ∀j,
Σjxij ≤ 1, ∀i,
xij ≥ 0, ∀i, j,
yj ≥ 0, ∀j.
The Optimal Allocation Strategy
Deriving the optimal solution to the problem is not straight-
forward. We propose to look at the problem from a different
perspective. That is, we are interested in whether the guaran-
teed contracts can also participate in the real-time auctions so
that they can also enjoy the liquidity and the impressions can
be fully auctioned. More specifically, can each guaranteed
contract be treated as a bidding agent which is able to submit
bids for impressions and the impression allocation is based
on the submitted bids from both guaranteed contracts and
RTB? We will show that such a setup can actually lead us to
the optimal allocation strategy.
Theorem 1. Suppose for each impression i, every contract j
submits a bid bij . Let b∗i = maxj bij and j
∗ = argmaxj bij .
4For simplicity, we take out the binary constraints of xij in
the formulation (LP1). It can be proved that the influence of this
simplification is negligible since in the optimal solution of (LP1),
the numbers of non-binary x∗ij are much fewer than that of binary
x∗ij .
Table 1: Notations for impression allocation.
Notations Descriptions
dj Impression demand of contract j.
cj Payment of one impression for contract j.
pj Contract violation penalty for one impression of contract j.
yj The shortfall of contract j.
xij Binary binary indicator whether impression i is allocated to contract j.
qij Impression i’s quality for contract j.
λj The impression quality weight for contract j.
b∗i Maximal bid of all guaranteed contracts for impression i.
bi1 The highest bid of impression i in RTB.
bi2 The second highest bid of impression i in RTB.
QGC The impression quality of all guaranteed contract.
RGC Total revenue of guaranteed contracts.
RRTB Total revenue of RTB.
yield RGC +RRTB +QGC
Consider the allocation strategy that allocates impression i to
contract j∗ if b∗i > bi2 and otherwise to RTB. The strategy
solves the optimization problem defined in (LP1) if the bid
from the guaranteed contract j takes the form:
bij = λj qij + αj (1)
, where αj ∈ [0, pj ].
Proof. The maximal revenue from RTB Σibi2, along with
the total payment from contracts Σjcjdj can be considered
as constants. Then, maximize Σij(1− xij)bi2 + Σjcjdj −
Σjyjpj + Σijλjxijqij can be simplified as maximize −
Σijxijbi2 − Σjyjpj + Σijλjxijqij . Thus, the dual problem
of (LP1) is as follows:
minimize
αj ,βi
Σiβi − Σjαjdj (LP2)
s.t. λjqij + αj − bi2 ≤ βi, ∀i, j, (2)
αj ≤ pj , ∀j,
αj ≥ 0, ∀j,
βi ≥ 0, ∀i.
Suppose the optimal solution to (LP1) and (LP2) are
x∗ij , y
∗
j and β
∗
i , α
∗
j respectively. We denote impression i’s
bid of contract j as bij = λjqij + α∗j . According to the
complementary slackness theorem, we have
x∗ij (bij − bi2 − β∗i ) = 0, ∀i, j, (3)
(Σjx
∗
ij − 1) β∗i = 0, ∀i. (4)
∀i = 1, 2, ..., n; j = 1, 2, ...,m:
• If bij < bi2 then bij − bi2 − β∗i < 0. Based on Eq. (3)
we can infer that x∗ij = 0, which means impression i is
allocated to RTB.
• If bij > bi2, we can infer that β∗i > 0 and
∑
j x
∗
ij = 1
according to Eqs. (2),(4), which means impression i is
allocated to guaranteed contracts. Let x∗ik > 0, then we
have bik = bi2 + β∗i based on Eq. (3). Therefore bij ≤
bi2 + β
∗
i = bik , i.e., k = argmaxj bij . This means the
impression is assigned to the contract with maximal bid.
A Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning
Approach
As discussed in the last section, all guaranteed contracts are
considered as bidders and their optimal bidding functions
are given by Theorem 1. However, since they submit bids
in an unstable auction environment, as argued in section
1, the bids may deviate from the optimal one during the
real-time impression allocation process. Note that the bids
submitted by contract bidders are essentially determined by
the optimal impression allocation strategy, it is natural to
employ the MARL approach to coordinate the adjustments of
contract bidding functions close to the optimal ones as much
as possible. In the rest of this section, we first introduce the
MARL preliminaries, and then present our MARL approach
MAPOLO. The frequently used notations for MARL in this
paper are summarized in Table 2.
MARL Preliminaries
Reinforcement learning (RL) is a machine learning approach
inspired by behaviorist psychology. In RL, an agent interacts
with environment by sequentially taking actions, observing
consequences, and altering its behaviors in order to maximize
a cumulative reward. Multi-agent reinforcement learning
(MARL) is an extension of RL and usually formalized in a
Markov game framework (Littman, 1994). For a Markov
game with m agents, it consists of: a state space S = {s},
an collection of action spaces A1, ...,Am, state transition
dynamics T : S×A1× ...×Am → P(S) where P(S) is the
set of probability measures on S , an immediate reward func-
tion rj : S ×A1× ...×Am → R for agent j, and a discount
factor γ ∈ [0, 1]. A policy, denoted by pij : Oj → P(Aj),
where Oj is the partial observation of state S for agent
j and P(Aj) is the set of probability measures on Aj .
Each agent uses its policy to interact with the environ-
ment and gives a trajectory of states, actions, and rewards
{s1, (a(1)1 , ..., a(1)m ), (r(1)1 , ..., r(1)m ), ..., st, (a(t)1 , ..., a(t)m ), (r(t)1
, ..., r
(t)
m )}, where t ∈ [1, ..., T ]. For simplicity, we shorten
the element of the trajectory at step t as (st, at, rt). The
objective of agent j is to find a policy pi∗j to maximize its
expected sum of discounted rewards.
pi∗j = argmax
pij
E[ΣTt=1γt−1r
(t)
j |pij ] (5)
Modeling
Back to our problem, based on the optimal solution derived
in last section, we consider each contract as an agent and all
agents should cooperate with each other to regulate their αj
close to the optimal ones as much as possible based on the
current state of the environment. For agent j ∈ [1, 2, ...,m],
we consider an episodic Markov game with discount factor
γ = 1 where a deterministic episode (typically one day) starts
with contract demand amount dj , an initial bid parameter
α
(0)
j , and a contract violation penalty pj per impression. As
shown in Fig. 3, agents regulate their αj sequentially with
a fixed number of T steps (typically 15 minutes between
two consecutive steps) until the episode ends. At each time
Table 2: Notations for MARL modeling.
Notations Descriptions
T The episode length.
st The state of environment at time-step t.
o
(t)
j The observation of agent j at time-step t.
a
(t)
j The action of agent j at time-step t.
r
(t)
j The reward of agent j at time-step t.
α
(t)
j The parameter in Eq. (1) of contract j at time-step t.
Q
(t)
j Action-value function of agent j at time-step t, equaling
∑T
i=t γ
i−tr(t)j
Rj The return of agent j, equaling
∑T
t=1 γ
t−1r(t)j .
pirj (oj) The policy of agent j with reward function r, mapping oj to aj .
step t ∈ [1, ..., T ], agent j gets observation o(t)j based on
state st and takes an action a
(t)
j to adjust α
(t−1)
j to α
(t)
j , and
then receives an immediate reward r(t)j which is equaling the
yield of impressions between time-step t and t + 1. Agent
j’s bid for any impression i between time step t and t+ 1 is
decided by the optimal bidding function (1), and the goal of
each agent j is to learn a αj control policy to maximize the
cumulative reward Rj = ΣTt=1γ
t−1r(t)j . More specifically,
the core elements of the Markov game are further explained
as follows:
S: The state st should in principle reflect the contract sta-
tus and the RTB environment, which mainly includes
the following three parts: firstly, the time information,
which tells the agent the current stage of the impression
allocation process; secondly, the contract demand fulfill-
ment status, such as left impression volume to satisfy and
demand fulfilling speed; last, the reward rt, which rep-
resents the yield at time-step t. Note that the features in
state could be adjusted to adapt to the specific scenarios.
Aj : Recall that the goal of agent j is to adjust the parameter
αj in Eq. (1) close to the optimal one. We define the
actions as limited range of real numbers, typically takes
the form of α(t)j = α
(t−1)
j (1 + a
(t)
j ).
r
(t)
j : The immediate reward for agent j at step t is the yield
of the impressions between time-step t and t + 1. Note
that the immediate reward for each agent at step t is same
in a Markov game.
T : In our scenario, since the state space is too large to
be feasible for a model-based approach, we adopt the
commonly used model-free approach in our MARL algo-
rithms. Therefore, the transition dynamics are not explic-
itly modeled.
γ: The reward discount factor γ = 1 since the optimization
goal of the impression allocation problem is to maximize
total reward value regardless of the reward time.
There are common challenges for MARL to work well in
real applications. One of the most concerned challenges is
the convergence efficiency. Usually, a MARL process does
not converge efficiently due to the following three factors:
• Inefficient reward function: Reward function is critical
to the convergence efficiency of RL algorithms (Sutton,
Barto, and others), and the reward provided by environ-
ment may not directly related (such as linearly related) to
Allocation Simulation
s1 …a1 r1 sT aTrT s1 …a1 r1 sT aTrT
…
episode1 episodeK
Allocation
s1 …a1 r1 sT aTrT
Online episode
Offline Training Online Predicting
Agents Agents Agents
Figure 3: Illustration of MARL model training and predicting
process. Each episode contains T steps and agents will be
trained K episodes before being applied online.
the goal of maximizing return (Wu et al., 2018), which
makes agents have to resort to complicated exploration
strategies to improve performance.
• Non-stationary environment: From a single agent perspec-
tive, the environment would be non-stationary when the
policies of other agents keep changing (Tesauro, 2004),
which results in fluctuating reward for a specific state-
action pair. The non-stationary environment can signifi-
cantly slow down the convergence process.
• Input dimension explosion: The input dimension of MARL
methods would explode when the number of agents in-
creases (Lowe et al., 2017; Foerster et al., 2017). As a
result, the exploded dimension poses remarkable challenge
to the convergence efficiency.
MAPOLO We present the multi-agent policy optimization
with local observations (MAPOLO) approach to address all
the challenges above. As shown in Fig. 4, we adopt the multi-
agent actor critic framework in (Lowe et al., 2017), using a
shaped reward function to coordinate agents’ behaviors and
allowing each agent only receive the local observations.
The new reward function should be simple and direct,
which means a better state-action pair (leading to a better
return) should be given a larger reward. Meanwhile, we hope
the reward for a specific state-action pair not be affected by
other agents’ behaviors unless they have achieved a better
return, which will significantly relieve the challenge of non-
stationary environment. Inspired by the work in (Wu et al.,
2018), we believe the return of an entire episode would be
a feasible reward signal for all agents in MARL model. The
basic idea is that the larger the historical maximal return is,
the larger reward should be provided to all the state-action
pairs in the episodic trajectory, as shown in Eq. (6):
r(s, a
(t)
j ) = max
e∈E(s,a(t)j )
R
(e)
j (6)
where E(s, a(t)j ) represents the set of existing episodes that
agent j ∈ [1, 2, ...,m] took action a(t)j at state s, and R(e)j =
ΣTt=1γ
t−1r(t)j is the original return for agent j within episode
e. The episodic nature of the process is leveraged so that
new reward will be continuously updated during all policies’
optimizations.
Another good property of the reward function is that the
reward can be taken as coordinating information, indicating
Q1
o1 a1
π1
Qm
om
πm
am…
New reward function
…
…
Execution
Training
Figure 4: Illustration of MAPOLO. Agents are coordinated
by the new reward function defined by (6) during training
and each agent only need to take local observations as input.
which action under the current state will benefit the final
return. Therefore, we could just simplify the input of each
agent as local observations to avoid the dimension explosion,
which is a big challenge in existing MARL approaches5
(Lowe et al., 2017; Foerster et al., 2017). Further, we prove
that under some acceptable assumptions6, the new reward
defined in (6) will lead to the optimal policy of the original
Markov game.
Theorem 2. Let pi∗ = {pi∗1 , ..., pi∗m} be the optimal policy
for the original Markov game, and pir = {pir1, ..., pirm} be the
optimal policy for the Markov game with new reward defined
in Eq.(6). Then pir = pi∗ as long as all episodes start from the
same initial state and for each state there is only one optimal
action.
Proof. According to Eq. (5) and the Markov property, the
optimal policy at any state st with observation {o(t)j |j =
1, ...,m} is as follows,
pi∗j = argmax
pij
[ΣTi=1γ
−1r(i)j |pij ], ∀j = 1, ...,m,
⇒ pi∗j (o(t)j ) = argmax
pij
[ΣTi=tγ
i−tr(i)j |pij ], ∀j = 1, ...,m,
(7)
which means that pi∗j (o
(t)
j ) is the optimal action that maximize
the return of agent j.
Since the Markov game is deterministic and starts from the
same initial state, according to the theorem proven in (Wu
et al., 2018), the action pirj (o
(t)
j ) of each agent j is also the
optimal one that maximize the return for agent j, i.e.,
pirj (o
(t)
j ) = argmax
pij
[ΣTi=tγ
i−tr(i)j |pij ],∀j = 1, ...,m. (8)
This means {pir1(o(t)1 ), ..., pirm(o(t)m )} is an optimal action for
the multi-agent Markov game. Since the optimal action is
unique, we have pirj (o
(t)
j ) = pi
∗
j (o
(t)
j ),∀j = 1, ...,m, ∀t =
1, ..., T . Therefore pir = pi∗.
5In the standard paradigm of centralized training with decentral-
ized execution, the input of critic consists of all agents’ observations.
6The Markov game is deterministic and for each state there is
only one optimal action. Here deterministic means taking actions at
at state st will lead to st+1 with probability 1.
Experimental Evaluation
We evaluate our proposed method from two aspects. First, we
compare our approach with existing approaches and show its
advantages in the optimal impression allocation tasks. Sec-
ond, we demonstrate the desirable properties of our approach
in dealing with the common challenges in MARL.
Experiment Setup
Dataset The experiment datasets are from a leading e-
commerce advertising platform. We picked up five different
publishers on this platform and for each publisher we ex-
tracted the real ad serving logs of two consecutive days in
August, 2018. The five datasets contain more than 35 mil-
lions impressions in total. Each dataset consists of the ad
impressions, the guaranteed contracts, and the detailed RTB
auction information7. From each publisher’s perspective, the
environment such as the impression volume and RTB market
price distribution changed significantly in these two days.
The details of these datasets are shown in Table 3. We use the
data from the first day for training and those from the second
day for testing.
Evaluation Metrics The goal of the optimal impression
allocation task is to maximize the yield. Based on the optimal
bidding equation defined in (1), the theoretically best yield on
the testing dataset can be obtained, denoted by R∗. Let R be
the actual yield of the applied policy. The difference between
R and R∗, i.e. R/R∗, is a simple and effective metric to
evaluate the policy. For MARL algorithms, the convergence
efficiency are also critical for practical effectiveness. It can be
measured by the time consumed for converging to optimum
and the time consumed for training per episode.
Comparing Methods
1. Contract First (CF): A common impression allocation
strategy that combines a contract bidding function and
a potential contract shortfall tackling strategy. Based on
the optimal bidding function defined by (1), when a con-
tract shortfall risk is detected (Balseiro et al., 2014), all
remaining impressions are allocated to the contracts.
2. PID Controller (PID): A widely used technique in dis-
play advertising (Zhang et al., 2016) to fulfill contracts by
even pacing. We adopt this technique to regulate αj in Eq.
(1) to satisfy each contract j’s demand.
3. MADDPG: Based on the optimal bidding function defined
by (1), we implement the state-of-the-art MARL method
(Lowe et al., 2017) to coordinate the agents with immediate
reward function r(t)j for impression allocation.
4. MAPOLO: Based on the optimal bidding function defined
by (1), we implement our multi-agent policy optimization
method for impression allocation, in which agents only
receive local observations and the new reward function
defined by (6) is adopted.
7Due to confidential issues, the actual values related to revenue
are transformed into meaningless numbers.
Table 3: The datasets statistics and R/R∗ of CF, PID and
MAPOLO in 5 testing datasets.
Publisher Contracts Impressions ContractDemands
Impression
Difference
Market Price
Difference CF PID MAPOLO
1 68 4.9M 2.7M -6.4% -25.4% 0.92 0.90 0.93
2 7 2.9M 1.3M 4.8% 38.7% 0.86 0.89 0.92
3 25 2.8M 2.0M -15.5% 52.5% 0.79 0.83 0.87
4 53 5.6M 3.1M 25.6% -30.9% 0.88 0.89 0.96
5 5 149K 95K -20.6% 16.9% 0.89 0.91 0.92
Average 0.87 0.88 0.92
Table 4: Detailed results on datasets of publisher 3 and 4.
Publisher Method RGC RRTB QGC yield
3
Optimal 6701.31 11796.01 2694.98 21192.30
CF 6771.85 6581.27 3406.18 16759.30
PID 6771.85 8796.74 1925.04 17493.63
MAPOLO 2999.01 13671.47 1734.29 18404.77
4
Optimal 5473.19 10609.10 1243.20 17325.71
CF 6037.51 7904.39 1251.33 15193.23
PID 5950.39 8108.30 1345.32 15404.01
MAPOLO 5473.43 10185.15 1026.07 16684.65
Implementation Details We take a fully connected neural
network with 3 hidden layers and 64 nodes for both actor and
critic in each agent and another identically structured neural
network as the new reward function (6). The mini-batch size
is set to 32 and the replay memory size is set to 100,000. The
action range is limited to [−0.1, 0.1] and the action noise is
implemented by a normal distribution generator with mean
0 and standard deviation 0.05. Following the common prac-
tice of DDPG (Lillicrap et al., 2015), we set τ = 0.02 to
update target network parameters with that of actor and critic
network, and the learning rate of actor and critic is set to
1× 10−3 and 1× 10−4 respectively. We also conducted ex-
periments with different parameters. Larger action range and
standard deviation of the noise would deteriorate the conver-
gence efficiency due to larger exploration space, while tuning
other parameters usually leads to similar results.
Evaluation Results
We conduct experiments to compare the performance of CF,
PID, MADDPG and MAPOLO on all the five datasets. The
initial parameter α(0)j is set to be the optimal one of training
data. As argued in section 1, due to the instability of auction
environment, the impression volume and market price in the
testing data deviate from that of training data. To present
the performances of different approaches under the unsta-
ble environment, the instability statistics and experimental
results based on testing dataset are summarized in Table 3.
We can see that MAPOLO outperforms CF and PID in all
datasets, and the overall improvement over CF and PID is
5.7% and 4.5% respectively. It is worth noting that the result
of MADDPG is not listed due to the convergence efficiency
problem, which will be discussed in next subsection.
To further investigate these methods’ behaviors as the en-
vironment enormously changes, we present the detailed infor-
mation of yield for the representative datasets of publisher 3
and 4 in Table 4, including RGC , RRTB and QGC . Although
CF achieves good QGC in both datasets, it may result in
poor yield because of its belated adaptation to the environ-
ment change. Specifically, on dataset of publisher 3, when
the competition become fiercer, CF still bids with the α ob-
tained from yesterday, which makes the bid too low to win
sufficient impressions at the beginning of the day. In order
to satisfy the contract demands, all impressions, including
those with high RTB revenue, are allocated to contracts when
a shortfall risk is detected, therefore results in poor results
of RRTB . Similarly, on dataset for publisher 4, it bids with a
relatively higher α and wins impressions with higher price,
which results in poor RRTB .
Compared with CF, PID shows the ability to cope with en-
vironment changes and obtains higher yield on most datasets.
PID adjusts α to pace the impression acquisition. MAPOLO
is even better than PID due to the following two reasons. First,
it is critical for a PID strategy to be provided a proper target,
which is the optimal impression volume to be allocated at
each step. In practice, it is tricky and needs expert knowledge
to be continuously optimized. Second, recall that the bids
of contract bidders are determined by the allocation strat-
egy and they are globally optimized to maximize the joint
objective. . MAPOLO gives a proper solution to all these
problems, and coordinates all contract bidders’ behaviors to
deliver satisfying results in an unstable environment.
Convergence Efficiency and Scalability
Convergence efficiency and scalability is an important factor
that affects the practical value of MARL algorithms. Specif-
ically, for impression allocation, it is of great necessity to
accomplish the training process in an acceptable period of
time before real application. In this section, we present ex-
perimental evaluations to investigate convergence efficiency
and scalability of MADDPG and MAPOLO. We compare
both methods on two datasets: publisher 1 with 68 agents and
publisher 3 with 25 agents, and the results are illustrated in
Fig. 5.
We can see that MAPOLO converges much faster than
MADDPG and achieves satisfying R/R∗ of 0.9 in both
datasets. The reason why MAPOLO outperforms MADDPG
can be interpreted from two aspects: first, the new reward
function defined by Eq. (6) is more ”direct” and relieves the
non-stationary environment problem; second, for MAPOLO,
the input dimensionality for a single agent is not affected
by the increasing agent number, while MADDPG is signifi-
cantly suffered from that. When the agent number increases
2.7 times (25 to 68), the time consumption per episode for
MADDPG increases 4.7 times while MAPOLO only lin-
early increases 2.5 times. This scalability advantage makes
MAPOLO be applicable in scenario with more agents, espe-
cially in those large-scale industrial applications.
Related Work
Impression allocation, especially allocating between guaran-
teed contracts and RTB, is one of the most important issues to
monetize traffic for a publisher. (Ghosh et al., 2009) was the
first work considering contracts as bidders to compete with
RTB, but the goal was to maximize the representativeness of
contract impressions from the advertisers’ perspective. (Chen,
Yuan, and Wang, 2014) proposed a revenue maximization
strategy based on allocating and pricing the future contract
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Figure 5: Converging processes of MADDPG and MAPOLO
on dataset of publisher 1 and publisher 3. The x-axis is the
elapsed time and the y-axis is the R/R∗. Average time con-
sumption (in seconds) per episode of both methods are at-
tached as the metric of convergence efficiency.
impressions. However, the allocation was determined in ad-
vance rather than through real-time auctions. Balseiro et al.
(2014) proposed learning a stochastic policy to maximize
the yield of a publisher based on the contract first strategy,
which has been proved not optimal in our experimental evalu-
ations. Recently, a new strategy maximizing the total revenue
was proposed in (Jauvion and Grislain, 2018). However, the
challenge of environment instability was not discussed or
addressed.
Reinforcement learning (RL) has been widely studied in
computational advertising, especially in bidding strategy op-
timization (Cai et al., 2017; Amin et al., 2012). In MARL,
methods based on single agent settings usually deliver poor
performance (Matignon, Laurent, and Le Fort-Piat, 2012)
due to the non-stationary environment (Colby et al., 2015).
Although some Nash equilibrium algorithms are proposed
to solve this problem, it is hard to be applied in real-world
applications due to the computational complexity (De Cote
and Littman, 2012). (Yang et al., 2018) tries to address this
challenge via leveraging action information from neighbor
agents, but the concept of neighborhood is hard to be de-
fined in the online display advertising context. Our approach
follows the standard paradigm of centralized training with
decentralized execution, which does not need to define any
communication channels (Foerster et al., 2016; Mordatch
and Abbeel, 2017). (Lowe et al., 2017; Foerster et al., 2017)
are similar works and both are applicable to our problem.
We adopt (Lowe et al., 2017) for its simplicity and avoid the
reward credit assignment problem in (Foerster et al., 2017).
Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a MARL approach to maximize
the total yield of a publisher by allocating impressions be-
tween guaranteed contracts and RTB. We derived the opti-
mal impression allocation strategy by solving the optimal
bidding function when contracts are treated as bidders. In
order to implement the strategy with the practical challenges
such as environment instability, we propose an efficient
MARL method, MAPOLO, to coordinate agents’ behaviors
in real-time. MAPOLO also solved the common challenges
in MARL and achieved good convergence efficiency and scal-
ability compared with the state-of-the-art MARL methods.
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